The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the views of IKI JET or its implementing partners.

Sworn in as Indonesia’s eighth president on October 20, 2024, Prabowo Subianto has vowed to continue the legacy and vision of his predecessor and political ally Joko Widodo (known as Jokowi) on many fronts, including that of just energy transition. The transition has repeatedly been referenced in global and domestic climate and finance discussions since he assumed office.

His unexpected pledge to retire Indonesia’s entire fleet of coal-fired and other fossil-fuelled power plants within 15 years, made at the G20 Summit in Brazil in November 2024, has been met with scepticism in many quarters, not least because it contradicts the string of weak climate commitments issued during his predecessor’s tenure.

An Energy Transition Pledge Riddled with Loopholes

One of President Jokowi’s key legacies, and a source of personal pride, is the Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP) introduced during the G20 Summit in November 2022. At first glance, the JETP underscores Indonesia’s commitment to sustainable development through the use of renewable energy.

Even before the launch of the JETP, President Jokowi had already reinforced Indonesia’s energy transition goals by issuing a presidential regulation focused on accelerating the development of renewable energy for the country’s power supply. However, despite the emphasis on renewables and a ban on developing new coal-fired power plants, this regulation excluded a ban on for industrial facilities, thereby providing legal backing for the continued operation of coal-fired power plants in industrial areas until 2025. Furthermore, captive coal capacity increased eightfold between 2013 and 2023, with nearly a quarter of Indonesia’s operating coal capacity now for captive use. This loophole could lead to increased emissions from captive coal plants and undermine Indonesia’s energy transition efforts.

Unsurprisingly, when the JETP Comprehensive Investment and Policy Plan (CIPP) was unveiled a year later, it too left out captive power. This raises an important question: did this reflect a genuine political commitment by Jokowi to the energy transition, or are there deeper compromises at play?

After the CIPP was published in November 2023, former president Jokowi’s energy transition commitment continued to weaken. At the end of January 2024, he issued the Presidential Regulation on the Implementation of Carbon Capture and Storage Activities. This regulation aimed to capitalise on Indonesia’s status as a potential global carbon storage hub, which raised questions about storage risks, carbon ownership, and climate responsibilities when other countries dispose of their emissions and Indonesia becomes the landfill. This expensive technology will only extend the life of fossil fuel use, prolonging polluting industries like oil and gas and slowing the development of renewable energies.

In late May, Indonesia’s just energy transition commitment took another downward turn with the issue of a government regulation that grants special mining business permits to religious organisations.

While the permits were previously available only through a tender process for experienced mining companies, the Indonesian government then opened up the permits to religious groups, arguing that the tender process favours mining giants and that granting these licences to religious organisations will help promote the interests and welfare of local communities. In a swift response, the former minister of investment, Bahlil Lahadalia, promised to immediately grant mining business permits to the Nahdatul Ulama Executive Board (PBNU, or NU) and Muhammadiyah, both of which quickly accepted the government’s offer.

The government’s decision to grant coal mining concessions to two major Islamic organisations—NU and Muhammadiyah—was starkly at odds with its pledge to support a just energy transition.

Viewed from any perspective, coal is a destructive sector with manifold consequences, including environmental damage, deforestation around mining sites, and increased greenhouse gas emissions from coal-fired power plants, all of which contribute to the climate crisis and biodiversity loss. It follows, then, that the government should reduce the space for obtaining new coal mining permits rather than opening up new opportunities to acquire them. Any pledges that these organisations have made to ensure green mining in response to criticism should not hide that “green” and “coal” are undoubtedly incompatible. It is also worth noting that these organisations have no prior experience in mining, which raises concerns about their understanding of environmental, social, and governance (ESG) principles in the mining sector.

This decision will further change the dynamics of civil society by binding an influential group to prevent opposition. As stakeholders in the coal industry, both NU and Muhammadiyah can be expected to have little financial incentive to support a smooth just energy transition. This puts climate advocates and environmental groups, who are pushing for accelerated coal phase-out, in direct opposition to these influential organisations, limiting the effectiveness of their campaigns as a result.

There has been criticism of this move from within these organisations, especially from younger members who oppose the elite board. This internal opposition should be interpreted as part of efforts to save the organisations and as a starting point for greater public resistance towards fossil fuels controlled by oligarchs.

What to Expect from the Future

The pressing question now is whether President Prabowo’s administration will make any progress when it comes to Indonesia’s climate commitments. Frankly, the chances are small. The new president has repeatedly affirmed that he will uphold Jokowi’s legacy, in particular on energy policy. This indicates that Indonesia’s climate commitments are unlikely to see significant advancement over the next five years.

In fact, there are concerns that the situation could deteriorate further. Prabowo has longstanding connections to the coal industry and has received backing from prominent players in the fossil fuel sector. For instance, coal tycoon Garibaldi “Boy” Thohir openly endorsed the Prabowo-Gibran ticket during the 2024 presidential campaign.

Throughout his early weeks in power, Prabowo has often highlighted Indonesia’s commitment to energy transition, including the plans announced during the G20 Summit in Brazil to completely phase out coal plants and build 75 gigawatts of renewable power in the next 15 years. But these ambitious promises will be doomed to fail if no concrete change is made to address false climate solutions and include captive coal in the country’s early retirement plans.

Despite an apparently bleak future and a great deal of uncertainty, there remains a glimmer of hope. Energy politics are dynamic, and the new government could change its stance at any moment. It is obvious, however, that shifting Indonesia’s weak climate commitments will be no easy task. To make progress in spite of this, public and civil society organisations advocating for energy reform will need to exert pressure on Prabowo and his government. A potential starting point could be to improve the JETP CIPP, which is currently being revised by the JETP Secretariat. The updated plan had been slated for completion by the end of 2024 and expected to include new provisions related to captive power usage. However, as the JETP mandate has not been made into legislation, there is technically no obligation for the new administration to continue the programme.

Another path to a just energy transition involves bringing affordable renewable energies closer to communities, in contrast with the traditional centralised, large-scale energy system we have today. On the ground, local organisations and college students have led community-centred renewables initiatives, keeping the spirit alive and advancing climate justice.

As a positive example, the youth-led organisation Climate Rangers has launched various programmes across Indonesia, including promoting clean energy in Islamic boarding schools in Cirebon and North Sumatera, advocating for renewable energy to support green tourism in villages across Bali and Yogyakarta, and pushing for including solar-powered buses in Jakarta’s Transjakarta fleet. Moreover, Kanopi Hijau Indonesia, a local organisation in Bengkulu, is working with schools to install solar panels, while college students from Gadjah Mada University (UGM) are assisting local communities by installing solar panels in an East Kalimantan village and a micro-hydro power plant in Yogyakarta. It is projects like these that keep hope alive for a just energy transition that is rooted in community-based clean energy in Indonesia.

To achieve Jokowi’s vision of a just, affordable, and accessible energy transition, religious groups, as critical voices within Indonesia’s civil society, should be supporting renewables projects that supply clean electricity and deliver economic benefits to local communities. Instead, Jokowi chose to use these religious organisations to extend the protection for coal power. Now, the people must challenge the old guard, including President Prabowo and the elite players in the coal industry, to prevent them from weakening Indonesia’s climate commitments further and provide the space for hopeful, community-based projects.

Firdaus Cahyadi is a graduate student on the Natural Resources and Environmental Management programme at Bogor Agricultural University (IPB). Previously, he served as the interim Indonesia team lead for the climate organization 350.org.